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 Introduction
The state of prisons in European states has over the past 20 years 
increas-ingly come under the purview of the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR). In hundreds of judgments, the Strasbourg Court has 
applied fundamental human rights principles, pre-eminently the 
prohibition of torture and ill-treatment (art. 3 of the European Convention 
of Human Rights [ECHR]), to review complaints of detainees. Such 
complaints are 
related to deficient conditions of imprisonment, such as overcrowding, 
poor hygiene and sanitation, and lack of access to adequate health, 
among others. Until the 1990s, the European Commission of Human 
Rights (ECommHR) and the ECtHR applied a high threshold for 
detecting breaches of human rights.1 The ECtHR though took a more 
scrutinizing approach since the late 1990s and 2000s, gradually 
recognizing that par-ticular kinds of conditions and practices of 
incarceration cross the accept-able threshold of severity and violate the 
human rights of inmates. At the same time, European institutions and 
bodies, such as the European Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CPT), the European Commissioner for Human Rights of the 
Council of Europe (CoE), and more recently the EU, have over the 
past 15 years engaged in standard setting in regard to persons 
deprived of their liberty and in closer monitoring of European prisons.
On the basis of reviewing complaints by persons deprived of their lib-
erty, the ECtHR issues judgments that states that have ratified the ECHR 
are obliged to implement (art. 46 of the ECHR). Through the domestic 
implementation of those judgments, a process closely supervised by 
the Committee of Ministers (CoM) of the CoE, the ECtHR’s case law 
can exert a significant influence over prison reform in European 
states. National authorities are obliged to provide an individual remedy 
if they are found to have violated the ECHR, but also to institute 
general mea-sures aimed at preventing similar human rights 
infringements from recurring. General measures can take the form of 
legal reform, change in domestic courts’ jurisprudence, or change in 
administrative practices, and it can amount to broader policy change. 
To be sure, the ability of human rights judgments to influence, let 
alone instigate, reform of national laws and policies is highly 
contingent, and it is rarely direct or straightforward. Yet, studies show 
that under certain conditions and/or in certain issue areas, the reform 
and policy impact of the ECtHR’s judg-ments can be significant 
(Anagnostou 2013; Hillebrecht 2012; Helfer and Voeten 2014).
This chapter provides an overview of ECtHR judgments related to the 
state of European prisons and explores broad patterns of their 
implemen-tation across different states. In particular, it reviews the 
kinds of claims 
raised in petitions before the ECtHR, the main issues that emerge 
as salient and the states that are most frequently implicated in prison-
related infringements. It also discusses the measures that states tend 
to take to redress the respective violations, as well as the apparent 
obstacles to implementation. On the basis of the empirical data that 
we present, we provide a general appraisal rather than a systematic 
investigation of state implementation. In view of the large number of 
states reviewed, this study does not engage in any in-depth analysis 
of the domestic factors that impact upon implementation of prison-
related judgments or of the influence of these judgments upon domestic 
prison reform—tasks which far exceed the size and scope of our 
chapter.
In this study, we are primarily concerned with the human rights review 
of cases that pertain to ‘passive’ ill-treatment of inmates, in large part 
a result of deficient material conditions and organization, as well as 
of unacceptable penitentiary practices of a state’s prison system. We do 
not examine cases pertaining to deliberate or ‘active’ infliction of ill-
treatment of inmates by prison and police authorities. While the latter is 
also a part and characteristic of a country’s penitentiary system and 
culture, we focus on the former aspect of ill-treatment because it is 
more directly con-nected to the concrete and structural conditions of 
imprisonment, as well as to penal law and policy.2 The material 
infrastructure and organiza-tional arrangements shape the general 
environment and the physical con-ditions in which persons are detained, 
but also the specific circumstances of the prisoner (Marochini 2009: 
1113).
For the purpose of this study, we have compiled a data set of 
165 adverse judgments of the ECtHR issued in 1990–2015, which find 
viola-tions of the Convention. Many of these judgments pertain to 
prison overcrowding, and to poor material conditions more broadly, as 
well as to inhuman or degrading conditions that are specifically 
experienced by inmates with a variety of health problems (mental, 
psychological, and physical). Individuals with health problems, often 
severe ones that occa-sionally lead to suicidal tendencies or suicide, 
are often more vulnerable and less able to withstand the general prison 
conditions. Many inmates also develop health problems while being 
held in prison or placed in dis-ciplinary cells and other kinds of solitary 
confinement. Although the Convention does not guarantee the right 
to prisoners’ health care, the 
ECtHR in its case law has conceded that prison authorities are under a 
positive obligation to protect the health of persons deprived of their  
liberty. The lack of appropriate medical care or delay in providing medi-
cal help to inmates may constitute a violation of art. 3.3
A major sub-category of judgments related to detention conditions 
originates from immigrants and asylum seekers, who are lawfully or 
unlawfully detained in facilities that are unacceptable by human rights 
standards. While we cover human rights judgments that pertain to deten-
tion conditions experienced by migrants and asylum seekers, we do 
not consider how states respond to violations regarding the 
lawfulness of migrants’ detention per se; the latter issue exclusively 
falls within the remit of migration policy rather than of prison 
conditions and penal reform. Furthermore, in this study, we do not 
include cases that concern hunger strikes in detention, a special 
category of cases that is not directly linked to overall conditions of 
detention. We also do not include a rich and highly controversial strand 
of case law that pertains to the interfer-ence of prison authorities with 
prisoners’ correspondence, and therefore with their right to privacy, as 
well as the body of case law in which the political rights of prisoners 
are at stake. We exclude these bodies of case law, which, albeit highly 
significant, are also not directly related to prison conditions as such.
The supervision mechanism of the ECHR system is centred on the 
CoM. This supervisory mechanism has been in a process of rapid 
change and radical overhaul over the past 10 years. It has placed an 
emphasis on the systemic causes of human rights violations and 
has had a major impact on the execution of judgments related to 
prison conditions and penal reform. The large number of repetitive 
human rights violations has rendered this issue area a typical one for 
the application of the pilot pro-cedure.4 The first part of the chapter 
describes the processes and mecha-nisms of domestic 
implementation of ECtHR’s judgments and their supervision and 
monitoring by the CoM. The second part provides an overview of the 
relevant ECtHR’s judgments and the issues that they raise, and the 
violations detected by the Court. The third part of the chapter 
describes and discusses the kind of reforms and measures that 
national authorities undertake by way of implementing the general mea-
sures that are called for by the relevant ECtHR judgments.
 The ECHR System and Other Bodies 
Monitoring Prison Conditions
Since the 1990s, the overall prison population across Europe and 
the CoE states has been rising. Nonetheless, substantial variation 
remains both in the evolution of the total population of inmates over time 
and in the prison population rate (PPR) across countries.5 Persons from 
margin-alized groups and ethnic minorities tend to be over-
represented among the prison population, while the proportion of 
non-nationals among inmates has also been rising in European 
countries (Coyle 2006: 129).6 The large discrepancies observed in the 
prison population of the different European states are arguably related 
to differences in prevalent views about imprisonment as the most 
severe form of punishment in contem-porary Europe (since the death 
penalty and corporal punishment have been abolished) and what is 
intended to achieve (Coyle 2006: 107) or to low levels of social trust and 
political legitimacy that may render policies in some countries more 
punitive than others (Lappi-Seppälä 2011). The causes of this rising 
trend are complex, and they cannot be seen to be a direct reflection of 
increased levels of criminality. Instead, it is signifi-cantly linked to 
factors such as the introduction of more punitive crimi-nal justice 
legislation with prison sentences for crimes that would not have 
previously received such sentences (e.g. for drug abuse) or lengthier 
periods of incarceration. Prevailing stances among politicians and 
the media, which encourage judicial authorities to send more 
people to prison for longer periods of time, have arguably also 
contributed to the overall rise in prison population.
Regardless of the actual causes of increased levels of incarceration, 
the available prison places in many CoE member states have not 
kept up with the rising number of prisoners. This has led to a 
significant and generalized problem of prison overcrowding, which is 
often more pro-nounced in pre-trial detention facilities. Besides 
overcrowding, a variety of other conditions, rules, and practices that 
define detention regimes have come under fire from international 
organizations and NGOs for constituting a living situation for inmates 
that does not meet basic human rights standards (Coyle 2006: 104). The 
CoE Commissioner for Human 
Rights has recently characterized prison conditions in several 
European countries as ‘appalling’, referring to prison overcrowding, lack 
of privacy, unacceptable disciplinary procedures to deal with violence 
and other types of misconduct by inmates, solitary confinement, 
inadequate provi-sion of and access to medical care, education and job 
training, as well as a particularly harsh regime for those serving life 
sentences (so-called lif-ers) (Hammarberg 2011: 241–246).
Already in the early 1970s, the CoE, prompted by the UN Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (1957), adopted its first 
set of prison standards (the European Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners 1973). These were later revised and published 
in 1987 as European Prison Rules, and they were subsequently 
amended in 2006.7 At the same time, the CPT was set up under the 
CoE’s European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which came into force 
in 1989 and which has been ratified by all the 47 member states of the 
CoE. The CPT’s main activity is practical and pre-emptive action 
through non-judicial inter-vention by means of on-site visits to assess 
existing conditions and prac-tices in places of detention in the 
contracting states. Through its reports, it communicates its findings to 
the state concerned and seeks to engage in constructive dialogue and 
cooperation with the national authorities. Its main goal is to improve 
respect for and compliance with human rights standards for detainees.
The application of human rights principles in relation to prison condi-
tions by the ECtHR, and by courts more broadly, is constrained by a 
number of aspects. Lawful imprisonment is intended to be a form of 
punishment. In this context, practices, such as social isolation, which 
may be considered harsh or inhuman in general, are accepted to inhere 
in the nature of incarceration as a punitive institution. Therefore, they 
are less likely to be regarded as contrary to the prohibition of degrading 
and inhuman treatment, unless there is indication or proof that a 
particular kind of mistreatment was deliberately inflicted upon an inmate. 
This may be even more so when an offender is considered to pose a 
danger to pub-lic safety. In this case, more stringent disciplinary 
measures may be con-sidered necessary for the sake of maintaining 
prison order, re-evaluating accordingly the standards of humane 
treatment in reference to what is 
otherwise an absolute prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment 
(art. 3 of the ECHR). All of these aspects weaken the potential of judicial 
bodies’ review to uphold robust human rights standards in prisons.
An additional factor constraining the effectiveness of judicial review in 
relation to prisons is the fact that the provision of decent detention con-
ditions requires substantial economic resources. Courts, however, 
are often reluctant to interfere with matters dependent on policy 
decisions about how to allocate a finite amount of resources (for a 
discussion of these factors, see Foster 2015: 383). Still, the ECtHR 
observes that the lack of resources cannot justify prison conditions 
which are so poor as to reach the threshold of treatment contrary to 
art. 3 of the Convention, even as it recognizes that a country’s socio-
economic hardships may ham-per attempts to improve such conditions.8
Through its standard-setting and fact-finding activities, the CPT com-
plements the judicial work of the ECtHR (Murdoch 2006: 164). 
Applicants to the ECtHR often rely on the CPT’s findings to establish 
the factual background to conditions of detention in a particular country, 
as well as to construct the normative arguments that condemn a particu-
lar kind of treatment of detainees, largely in reference to art. 3 ECHR. The 
ECtHR (and formerly the ECommHR) has also regularly drawn on CPT 
reports in assessing the impact of detention conditions on the applicant 
(Marochini 2009: 1120). Some of the standards that the CPT has devel-
oped concern living accommodation and basic needs; staff 
selection, training and management; provision of an adequate regime 
of activities; and provision of health care in prisons. As regards living 
accommodation and basic needs, the CPT has established some 
rough guidelines, espe-cially concerning the size of cell space 
(Marochini 2009: 1119). Developments in the protection of prisoners 
resulting from the cumula-tive work of the ECtHR and the CPT have 
created new standards for the treatment of prisoners and their detention 
conditions (Marochini 2009: 1109). While the standards promoted by 
the CPT were more detailed and rigorous in comparison to the ECtHR
—in part, a difference stem-ming from the fundamentally different 
nature of each body’s work and intervention—the Strasbourg Court has 
increasingly aligned the norms it applies in its case law with the CPT 
standards and assumed a more proac-tive approach (Murdoch 2006: 
166–167).
National authorities must choose the individual and general 
measures whereby they will implement the final judgments. The 
Court cannot annul, repeal, or modify statutory provisions or 
decisions taken by administrative, judicial, or other national 
authorities. While it is not empowered to indicate or suggest which 
specific individual or general measures the national authorities in a 
case should undertake, the Court has, in certain types of cases, which 
involve structural and systemic prob-lems, become more willing and 
forthcoming in indicating appropriate general measures (Forst 2013: 4; 
Sicilianos 2014). General measures in response to the ECtHR’s 
judgments may include legislative amendments and administrative or 
executive measures (i.e. ministerial circulars or reg-ulations) in areas of 
state laws and policies that directly or indirectly come under the Court’s 
purview in the context of examining individual cases (Sundberg 2001: 
573–574). They may also include other actions, such as translation and 
dissemination of the ECtHR’s judgments to national judges, as well 
as educational activities and other practical measures. Under the 
new working methods introduced as of January 2011, respon-dent states 
have to submit action plans/reports for the implementation of judgments 
within six months from the time a judgment becomes final. This 
prompts governments to react quickly to a finding of a violation by the 
Court.
In its periodic but regular meetings, the CoM, with the assistance of 
the Directorate General of Human Rights, reviews the information 
about the individual and general measures, which is communicated to 
it by national authorities. When these are considered to be sufficient to 
remedy the underlying violation, as well as to prevent its recurrence, the 
CoM terminates its supervision of a case by adopting a final resolution 
(Anagnostou and Mungiu-Pippidi 2014: 210–211).9 For a long time, 
the supervisory role of the CoM was viewed as highly deferential to 
national authorities (Martens 1996: 77). Since 2000, however, despite 
the political constraints that underpin the CoM as a body, its role has 
become more transparent and scrutinizing in order to determine the 
efficacy of state actions (see CoM 2013: 21–27). Following the intro-
duction of new rules in 2001 and subsequently in 2006, the agenda and 
content of the CoM meetings are no longer confidential (Bates 2005). 
Instead, detailed and timely publication of all relevant documents 
examined by the CoM has provided greater visibility to the process of 
judgments’ execution by states. The CoM is now entitled to receive 
information pertaining to execution of the ECtHR’s judgments from 
national human rights institutions, from other states, civil society, as 
well as from international organizations and other CoE organs such 
as the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and 
the CPT (Sitaropoulos 2008: 530–532).
The new rules of procedure and the new tools that the CoM 
possesses to exercise its supervisory role significantly dwell upon 
judgments detect-ing human rights violations of a systemic nature. The 
first explicit attempt by the ECtHR to specifically deal with the 
challenges of breaches stem-ming from structural problems was the 
introduction of a ‘pilot judgment’ procedure.10 Through this process, the 
Court selects a particular case as characteristic of a structural 
problem, which has led to violations in a large number of cases 
brought before the Court. It asks the respondent state to identify the 
dysfunction(s) that is at the root of repetitive viola-tions, and it gives 
some indication about the measures that should be instituted with the 
goal of eliminating those violations. The cases pro-cessed under a 
pilot procedure are given priority by the Court, which may adjourn 
the examination of all similar applications pending the adoption of 
the remedial measures in the pilot judgment.11 In this way, the pilot-
judgment procedure induces the respondent state to also take 
retroactive measures to address infringements in all similar cases 
arising from the same structural problem at the domestic level (Forst 
2013: 19). The CoM now (following the adoption of Protocol No. 14, 
June 2010) adopts the enhanced procedure (as opposed to the 
‘standard procedure’) for pilot judgments and judgments raising 
structural and/or complex problems as identified by the Court or by the 
CoM (see Department for the Execution of Judgments of the 
ECtHR (DG-HL), CM/Inf/DH(2010) 37, 6 September 2010: 2).
In view of this more rigorous kind of supervision exercised by the 
CoM over the past couple of years, states are likely to be under 
enhanced pressure to address human rights problems related to 
unacceptable prison conditions. Nonetheless, in its latest report on the 
implementation of the ECtHR judgments, the PACE expressed concern 
about the large number of non-implemented judgments pending before 
the CoM (nearly 11,000 
cases), many of which reflect complex, structural problems. It also identi-
fied poor prison conditions among the most persisting structural causes 
of human rights violations, as well as among the outstanding human 
rights issues in the seven states with the highest number of non- 
implemented cases (Italy, Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Greece, Poland, and 
Bulgaria) (Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights 2015). At the 
end of 2014, poor detention conditions made up 14% of all cases under 
enhanced supervision by the CoM (based on the number of leading cases, 
i.e. cases that reveal complex and systemic problems in a state and 
which are often sources of recurrent infringements) (Committee on Legal 
Affairs and Human Rights 2015: 11).12 We now turn to review the 
kinds of issues and problems related to places of detention, which 
give rise to numerous human rights violations.
 Strasbourg Court Judgments Pertaining 
to Prison Conditions in Europe
While there were a few petitions related to prisoners’ claims and rights in 
the 1970s and in the 1980s (mainly from the UK), the ECtHR did not 
find a violation related to detention conditions until much later—accord-
ing to our sample, until 1998 in the case of Ilhan v. Turkey—13which was 
not primarily about conditions of detention but about the mistreatment 
that a Kurdish applicant had suffered by prison authorities in the north-
eastern parts of Turkey, which were then under a state of 
emergency. Earlier, ECtHR judgments implicating countries such as 
Belgium and Switzerland occasionally found a violation,14 but they 
often found no violation15 or ended with a friendly settlement.16 Our 
data set comprises 165 adverse judgments, namely cases in which the 
ECtHR found at least one violation of the ECHR in relation to prisons and 
imprisonment con-ditions. We selected these judgments by searching 
through the official database of the ECtHR (HUDOC), the Court’s 
factsheets, other reports, and secondary literature. While we have no 
way of ensuring or verifying its representativeness, our close perusal of 
the Strasbourg Court’s case law makes us confident that the studied 
sample contains most of the impor-tant judgments issued by the 
ECtHR. We also believe that it provides a 
fairly accurate picture of the European countries and issue areas, where 
human rights violations occur.
Spread across 21 countries, the violations recorded in our data set can 
be subdivided into six issue areas. In the first place, unacceptable condi-
tions of detention in pre-trial/remand centres is a major source of 
human rights violations. Such conditions are characterized by 
overcrowding, substandard material infrastructure, limited or no outdoor 
access or out- of- cell activities,17 limited or no family visits, extended 
periods of pre- trial detention,18 interference with a detainee’s 
communication with his/her lawyer, and lack of or no health provisions 
for prisoners suffering from serious illnesses.19 Lack of space in pre-
trial centres is particularly pronounced. Applicants referred to cells, 
where each detainee had between 1 and 2 m2,20 or even less than 
1 m2 available.21 Moreover, they referred to situations where they had to 
sleep in turns due to the fact that there were not enough beds available.22 
Lack of windows or ventilation,23 no proper heating, poor food quality, 
disrupted water and electricity pro-vision,24 and cockroaches, ants, and 
rats infestation25 were some of the characteristics of deficient 
conditions in pre-trial detention facilities. Poor or no sanitary facilities 
were common in pre-trial/remand centres.26 Detainees described 
situations where they were allowed limited short vis-its a day to the 
sanitary facilities, and in order to relieve themselves out-side the time 
earmarked for toilet visits, detainees had to use a bucket.27 Applicants 
also complained about obstacles in the communication with their 
lawyers, such as rooms where they were separated by a glass parti-tion, 
with no space for exchanging documents, across which they claimed they 
had to shout to hear each other.28
Cases involving health-related issues in prison were about the 
following: (a) inadequate medical care given the applicant’s health record; 
(b) negli-gence in prescribing appropriate medical treatment and 
subsequent dete-rioration of applicant’s health due to the lack of medical 
treatment; and (c) detention conditions that were unsuitable for the 
therapeutic needs of the applicant or for his/her disability. A large number 
of cases concerned the failure to provide due medical care to an 
applicant suffering from a serious disease.29 In one case, for instance, 
despite the fact that the com-petent authorities had been informed that 
the applicant was suffering from cirrhosis and that his condition 
necessitated appropriate treatment,
it was not until measures had been indicated by the ECtHR that the 
applicant began to receive regular check-ups.30 Moreover, in a number 
of cases, negligence in failing to prescribe adequate medical treatment 
and subsequent deterioration of the applicant’s health due to the lack of 
med-ical treatment were reported.31 For instance, in one case, the 
Court con-cluded that the applicant had developed tuberculosis between 
the time he had been taken into police custody and the date on which the 
disease had been detected, on account of the poor conditions of his 
detention.32 Furthermore, detention conditions that were inappropriate 
for the thera-peutic needs of the applicant were at stake in other 
cases.33
The vulnerability of mentally ill people and persons with disability34 
calls for special protection and was at stake in a number of cases. In 
one case, for instance, the Court stated that the authorities had failed to 
com-ply with their obligation to protect the applicant’s right to life, as 
the applicant’s placement in a punishment cell deprived him of visits 
and all activities, and subsequently aggravated the existing risk of 
suicide.35 In another case, the Court concluded that inadequate 
medical care forced a prisoner suffering from severe epilepsy to rely 
for assistance and emer-gency medical care on his cellmates.36 In its 
judgment of Vincent v. France, the Court found that the detention facility 
was particularly unsuited to the imprisonment of persons with a 
physical handicap who could move about only in a wheelchair.37
Judgments related to the material conditions of prison facilities 
detected violations stemming from (a) overcrowding and (b) poor 
material condi-tions (e.g. ill-lit, poorly ventilated cells, insanitary 
conditions, and inad-equate outdoor exercise). A large number of 
violations concerned overcrowded cells.38 The Court observed that 
for substantial periods of time, applicants’ cells had been overcrowded, 
leaving them with less than the statutory minimum ‘humanitarian’ amount 
of space. In one case, for instance, the Hungarian government had 
acknowledged overcrowding in the Hungarian prisons and that there 
had been 50% more prisoners in the Budapest prison than existing 
places. In this regard, the Court further noted that the Hungarian 
authorities had to rapidly take the necessary administrative and 
practical measures in order to improve the conditions in which detainees 
were kept in Hungarian prisons.39 In yet another case, the Italian 
government had acknowledged that there was a structural 
problem of overcrowding in Italian prisons. The Court decided to apply 
the pilot-judgment procedure in view of the growing number of persons 
potentially concerned in Italy. It called on the authorities to put in place, 
within one year, a remedy or combination of remedies providing redress 
in respect of violations of the Convention resulting from overcrowding in 
prison.40
Overall, poor material conditions were a common violation in a num-
ber of cases.41 With specific regard to such cases, the Court stated 
that lack of space had been made worse by aggravating factors, such as 
the lack of exercise, particularly outdoor exercise, lack of privacy, and 
insalubrious conditions. In one case, for instance, the Court observed 
that the appli-cant had been held in ill-lit and poorly ventilated cells for 
almost four years and had had to endure cramped and insanitary 
conditions and a total lack of privacy when using the toilet facilities.42 In 
another case, the Court observed that the problems arising from prison 
overcrowding in Belgium, and the problems of unhygienic and 
dilapidated prison institu-tions, were structural in nature. In this 
regard, it recommended that Belgium envisage adopting general 
measures guaranteeing prisoners con-ditions of detention compatible 
with art. 3 of the Convention.43 Similarly, in another case, the Court 
identified a systemic problem within the Bulgarian prison system 
because of the serious and persistent nature of the problems on 
account of overcrowding and lack of privacy and per-sonal dignity 
when going to the toilet.44 A pilot-judgment procedure was adopted in 
regard to Bulgaria. Overcrowding and poor material condi-tions often 
lead to deterioration of an applicant’s already fragile health 
condition.45
Violations related to inhuman treatment while in detention pertain to 
solitary confinement, strip searches, and generally behaviour 
towards inmates that amounts to degrading treatment. A large number 
of cases concerned violations with respect to solitary confinement.46 
In those cases, the Court generally criticized the conditions and length 
of solitary confinement, and emphasized that solitary confinement was 
only appro-priate as an exceptional and temporary measure. In one case, 
for instance, the Court found that the conditions of the applicant’s 
detention in soli-tary confinement had been such as to cause him both 
mental and physi-cal suffering and a strong feeling of being stripped of 
his dignity.47 In the 
same case, the Court further found that the main reason for the appli-
cant’s solitary confinement had not been his protection but rather his 
sexual orientation, which constituted discriminatory treatment. In 
another case, the applicant had spent almost his entire time in prison 
under a special security regime, alone in his cell, seeing almost no 
other people, being constantly handcuffed when outside his cell, and 
having to endure daily body cavity searches as a security measure.48
Additionally, a large number of cases also concerned strip 
searches, which the Court found that they resulted in human rights 
violations.49 The Court reiterated that strip searches and even full body 
searches could be necessary on occasion to ensure prison security—
including the pris-oner’s own safety—or to prevent disorder or crime. 
However, they also had to be conducted in an ‘appropriate manner’ 
so that the prisoner’s distress or humiliation did not exceed the level 
which such searches inevi-tably entail. In one case, for instance, the 
applicant alleged that he had been obliged to strip naked in the 
presence of a woman prison officer with the intention of humiliating 
him; he had been then ordered to squat, and his sexual organs and 
the food he had received from the visitor had been examined by guards 
who had worn no gloves.50 Finally, degrad-ing treatment was another 
main issue related to inhuman detention vio-lations.51 In one case, for 
instance, prison authorities had deliberately withheld a drug-addict 
prisoner’s medication and locked her in her cell as a punishment for her 
difficult behaviour; they had administered her med-ication irregularly, and 
they had left her lying in her own vomit.52 The Court reiterated that it 
was incumbent on states to organize their prison systems in such a way 
as to ensure respect for prisoners’ dignity, regardless of logistical or 
financial difficulties.
In relation to conditions of detention under special prison regimes, 
there were 11 violations in our sample (5 of them from Ukraine). In the 
cases against Ukraine, the Court observed that the applicants’ 
complaints raised serious issues of a general nature affecting the 
application of art. 3 of the Convention in relation to the conditions of 
detention of death-row prisoners. Moreover, the Court noted that where 
the death penalty was imposed, the personal circumstances of the 
condemned person, the con-ditions of detention awaiting execution, and 
the length of detention prior to execution were examples of factors 
capable of resulting to a treatment 
or punishment that infringes art. 3 of the ECHR. While bearing in mind 
Ukraine’s socio-economic problems and the prison authorities’ difficul-
ties with the implementation of new legislation and regulations, the 
Court nonetheless concluded that a lack of resources could not in prin-
ciple justify prison conditions so poor as to constitute inhuman and 
degrading treatment.53
A significant number of cases also concerned the conditions and 
dura-tion of detention in special prison regimes.54 The Court held that 
keeping detainees under the ‘dangerous detainee’ regime for several 
years, in isola-tion, without sufficient mental and physical stimulation, 
and without examining if there were concrete reasons for the prolonged 
application of that regime, was not necessary in order to ensure safety in 
prison. In two cases against Poland, the Court acknowledged that in 
order to ensure safety in prison, prisoners could be subjected to tighter 
security controls, involving constant supervision of their movements 
within and outside the cell, monitoring via close-circuit television, 
limitations on their con-tact and communication with the outside world, 
and some form of seg-regation from the prison community. However, 
the Court concluded that the duration and severity of the measures 
exceeded the requirements of prison security and that they were not in 
their entirety necessary.55
Finally, 13 violations in our sample related to violence, ill-treatment, or 
suicide in prison, specifically in regard to the failure of the authorities to 
guarantee the protection of a prisoner’s life,56 as well as a prisoner’s 
physi-cal and psychological integrity.57 In one of these cases, for 
instance, the Court found that the Turkish authorities had not only been 
indifferent to the applicant’s son’s grave psychological problems, even 
threatening him with disciplinary sanctions for previous suicide 
attempts. They had also been responsible for a deterioration of his state 
of mind by detaining him in a prison with adults without providing any 
medical or specialist care, which eventually led to his suicide.58 In 
another case, the facility’s author-ities had failed to guarantee the 
protection of a prisoner’s physical and psychological integrity. The 
Court noted that the administration had not attempted to regularly 
monitor the conduct of inmates prone to being violent or take any 
disciplinary measures against the offenders. It was only after the last 
incident, which was described as the culmination of the applicant’s ill-
treatment, that the authorities removed him from his cell. 
Still no meaningful attempts had been made to provide the applicant 
with psychological rehabilitation in the aftermath of the events.59
In identifying the countries with the largest numbers of human rights 
violations related to prisons and imprisonment, Table 1 must be read in 
conjunction with Table 2.
As we discussed in the previous section though, since 2010, the 
pilot procedure and the new rules of the CoM supervisory mechanism 
have enabled the Court and the Committee to group large numbers of 
cases together when it is recognized that certain kinds of violations in a 
coun-try are repetitive and have systemic causes. While several CoE 
states have petitions and violations related to unacceptable detention 
conditions, as our sample shows, there are a number of states where 
the problem of prison overcrowding and poor detention conditions is 
particularly severe and widespread and from which dozens of repetitive 
petitions are pend-ing before the Court. Our data confirm the findings 
of the latest report of the PACE of the Committee on Legal Affairs and 
Human Rights on the implementation of judgments, which identifies 
the following eight countries: Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Italy, 
Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, and Poland (see Committee on Legal 
Affairs and Human Rights 2015: addendum). These eight countries 
assemble a much larger number of prison-related cases than Table 1 
shows. In five of these countries, the ECtHR has applied the pilot-
judgment procedure at least once (Russia, Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, 
Romania) or it has grouped a larger number of cases under leading 
judgments (Greece, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Poland). While Bulgaria in 
Table 1 shows only 4 violations, Table 2 shows that 24 cases are 
grouped under the leading judgment of Kehayov v Bulgaria, 2005. In 
2015, the ECtHR adopted the pilot judgment of Neshkov and others v. 
Bulgaria in view of the deteriorating situation of the penitentiary system in 
the country, despite earlier leading judgments and recommen-dations by 
the CPT, in response to which Bulgaria had pursued reforms. The vast 
majority of judgments involve violation of art. 3 of the ECHR.
Altogether, both Tables 1 and 2 depict the countries with the most 
serious prison-related human rights problems: Russia, 
Romania, Greece, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Ukraine, secondarily 
followed by France, Poland, Italy, and, less so, Belgium. The 
countries with the highest number of violations manifest problems 
across most issue 
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areas (Russia, Hungary, Ukraine, Greece, France, Poland). At 
the same time, some countries reveal a particularly problematic 
issue area that has given rise to a large number of violations, such 
as prisoners’ health-related issues in France, prison 
overcrowding in Russia, Romania, and Greece, and violations 
related to special prison regimes in Ukraine. In France, studies 
have shown that people with mental health problems are over-
represented in French prisons—an outcome of a variety of 
organizational and penal law changes since the 1980s—where 
appropriate and adequate care is woefully insufficient 
(Chantraine 2015: 38–39).
Across countries, the most problematic issue area is by far prison 
over-crowding and poor material conditions overall (with 35.7% of our 
sam-ple of violations), with health-related violations—evidenced as 
much in long-standing members such as France and Belgium as in 
more recent CoE members from the ex-communist world such as 
Georgia, Romania, and Russia—coming second (28.5%). Prison 
overcrowding directly con-nected with issues such as personal privacy, 
hygiene, recreation space and time, and so on make up the material 
preconditions that shape the expe-rience of incarceration; they both 
reflect and in turn reinforce the enhanced or conversely reduced 
ability of a penitentiary system to ensure basic human rights standards 
for detainees. Substandard conditions of detention in pre-trial or 
remand centres (issue area 1) can be considered as a subset of 
overcrowding and poor material conditions (issue area 4). Together, 
they show that the decrepit physical infrastructure that falls below 
minimum human rights standards is a widespread feature of 
European prisons where persons are detained for short or longer 
periods of time.
 Domestic Implementation of Human 
Rights Judgments Related to Prison
This section provides an overview of how different states fare in imple-
menting the ECtHR’s judgments related to prison conditions and deten-
tion more broadly. We take a specific measure as a yardstick for 
assessing state implementation, namely, length of time in months. 
Anagnostou 
and Mungiu-Pippidi (2014) have used time to implementation as a mea-
sure of state performance in conjunction with the percentage of the 
respective ECtHR judgments that have been implemented by each state. 
The assumption is that the length of time that it takes states to give prac-
tical effect to an unfavourable judgment in tandem with the number of 
adverse judgments a state has implemented at each point in time 
captures a key parameter of human rights implementation—
namely, foot- dragging. Reluctance to comply often takes the form of 
procrastination or purposeful neglect on the part of national authorities. 
Lengthy periods of implementation in the meantime lead to recurrence 
of similar viola-tions, and thus of adverse judgments. As a measure, 
length of time to implementation is also used offhand by PACE and 
the CoM to distin-guish states that are better implementers from those 
that are more prob-lematic. According to Voeten (2014), though, time to 
implementation is directly connected to the complexity of the remedial 
measures and the difficulty of the implementation tasks required to 
redress particular human rights violations.
On the basis of time to implementation and percentage of executed 
cases, Table  3 provides a summary of state implementation of prison- 
related judgments. Length of time is counted in number of months from 
the delivery of a judgment by the ECtHR until the CoM terminates its 
supervision over it by issuing a final resolution (for closed cases), or num-
ber of months that a case is pending (for open, until March 2016). We 
see in the last three columns of Table 3 that prison-related violations are 
largely repetitive violations (45.5%). Another 31.5% are leading judg-
ments, and a 3.6% are pilot judgments and are under enhanced supervi-
sion by the CoM (the remaining 19.4% of our sample is not classified 
because they were issued before the latest changes in the rules of the 
CoM that introduced this distinction).
Overall, Table  3 shows that state implementation of prison-related 
judgments is highly problematic: only in 23.6% of the judgments has the 
CoM terminated its supervision by March 2016, while implementation 
was still pending in the remaining 76.4% of the judgments. Average time 
to implementation for closed cases is a bit more than five years, while in 
open cases, state compliance is on average pending for nearly six 
years. There are apparently significant differences across states. 
However, in 
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view of the highly unbalanced distribution of judgments (a couple of 
countries have less than a handful), we do not rely on these values for 
a statistical analysis. Still, failure to implement clearly stands out in 
some states, especially those with a high number of violations: Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine have not implemented any 
prison-related judgment against them and implementation is pending 
for more than five years (Poland, Romania) or more than six years 
(Turkey) or more than seven years (Russia, Ukraine).
Similarly, Hungary has not implemented any of the violating judg-
ments against it in our sample, which, however, have been pending 
for 3.5  years. Greece also displays poor performance with only 
12.5% of adverse judgments against it, and this after more than eight 
years. In most of the remaining judgments of our sample against 
Greece, which are more recent (mostly about prison overcrowding), 
implementation is pending for a little over three years. Similarly, Italy 
implemented some of the adverse judgments against it extremely 
slowly (after more than six years), while the remaining two are pending 
for more than eight years. By contrast, France and Georgia have a 
high percentage of judgments, in which execution was completed in 
a relatively shorter period of time (48.5 and 36.28 months, 
respectively) on average.
Time to implementation and percentage of closed cases by issue 
area complement cross-national variation and reveal some 
interesting and potentially significant patterns (Table 4).
What stands out is the very small portion of implemented judgments 
related to overcrowding and poor prison conditions (issue 4, only 7.27% 
closed) and those related to conditions of detention in remand centres 
(issue 1, 16.6% closed). It is not accidental that all six pilot judgments of 
our sample are related to these two issues, from which the most 
grave prison-related human rights problems stem. By contrast, a 
substantially larger percentage of adverse judgments are implemented 
in relation to violence, ill-treatment or suicide while in prison (issue 6), 
inhuman treat-ment while in detention (issue 3), and somewhat less 
judgments related to special prison regimes (issue 5) and health-related 
violations (issue 2). Generally, the open judgments in all issue areas 
are pending for imple-mentation for at least five years (on average for 
78.9 months, see Table 4). Violations related to special prison regimes 
are on average pending for an 
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excessively long time (122 months), which, however, partly reflects the 
dismal implementation record of Ukraine, from which nearly half of 
these violations originate (see Table 1).
The tiny proportion of judgments related to overcrowded and 
dilapidated conditions in prisons and remand centres (issues 1 and 4) 
that have been implemented by states possibly reflects the complexity 
of the necessary remedial measures and the amount of financial 
resources that the construction of new prisons or the revamping of old 
ones requires. Most of these judgments have been pending for imple-
mentation for at least five years on average. By contrast, a large per-
centage of violations related to inhuman detention, such as solitary 
confinement and strip searches (issues 3), have been implemented. 
These often require primarily individualized remedial measures or lim-
ited legal reform or internal disciplinary measures (if stemming from 
administrative practices), which are easier—at least if the political will 
exists—to apply. This finding appears to concur with the point raised 
by Voeten (2014), and which is mentioned earlier, namely, that the 
more complex, demanding and financially exigent the general mea-
sures, the slower and more reluctant national authorities are in imple-
menting them.
In order to redress overcrowding, far-reaching, organizationally com-
plex, and fiscally burdensome reforms are required, which take a long 
time to complete. In response to the detected violations related to poor 
prison conditions and overcrowding, governments in the above- 
mentioned eight states have pursued four sets of measures and reforms: 
(a) the building of new prison facilities or the creation of additional space in 
existing ones with the goal of improving cell space per inmate, (b) 
administrative and organizational changes in prison units, (c) legislative 
and policy changes in criminal law aimed at reducing the number of pris-
oners, the use and length of pre-trial detention, as well as the use of alter-
native punitive measures not involving physical deprivation of liberty for 
persons sentenced by a court, and (d) the establishment of bodies or 
offices to continuously monitor prison space and population. In the frame of 
judgment execution, these sets of measures are almost always accompa-
nied by the dissemination—translated in national language—of the 
respective judgment(s) to the competent authorities, as well as some
efforts to provide information and training to the prison staff and other 
administrative staff involved.
The construction of new prison facilities, or the reconstruction of 
existing facilities available in the penitentiary system into prisons, is 
among the reforms states initiate to address prison overcrowding. 
For example, already in the first decade of the 2000s (Kalashnikov 
group of cases), the Russian Ministry of Justice adopted a federal 
programme for reforming the country’s penitentiary system. It included 
the building of new remand prisons and the reconstruction of existing 
ones. As a result of this, by 2010, the number of spaces available 
had increased by 13,100. Notwithstanding a perceptible trend of 
improvement, the Court found, in 2012, in the pilot judgment of 
Ananyev and others v. Russia that the problem persisted. The latest 
2012 action plan of the Russian government contains numerous 
planned measures to improve the material conditions of detention, to 
establish effective domestic pre-ventive and compensatory remedies, 
and to ensure a more balanced approach towards the choice of 
preventive measures for suspects and the accused.60
In the context of implementing the ECtHR judgment of István Gábor 
Kovács, the Hungarian government estimated that the capacity of 
the Hungarian penal institutions would have to be increased by 70% in 
order to meet the CPT standards for personal space per inmate, and 
stated its intent to complete the construction of new facilities by 2018. 
The actual increase of new places that was accomplished in 2013, 
though, was only 160.61 The target of expanding prison facilities is to 
increase the average space per inmate in line with existing standards 
in domestic law and in European Prison Rules and the CPT reports. In 
response to the recent Neshkov v. Bulgaria pilot judgment, Bulgarian 
authorities have recently advanced legislative proposals for a more 
flexible initial allocation of pris-oners, which are under consideration in 
order to place prisoners in facili-ties that are less rather than more 
crowded, with the ultimate goal of reaching the target of 4 m2 per 
detainee.62 Such measures, however, are viewed by the CPT and the 
CoM as largely ineffective because they tend to generate new problems 
for prison management, as well as to disregard other vital issues, such 
as proximity of prison to one’s family.63
Together with the ECtHR, the CoM and the CPT have all under-
lined that the problem of unacceptable detention conditions is not 
solely or even mainly likely to be addressed through the construction of 
new prison facilities. Indeed, in its report on Hungary, the CPT stated 
that ‘…providing additional accommodation cannot on its own offer a 
lasting solution. The only viable way to control overcrowding is to 
adopt policies designed to limit or moderate the number of persons 
sent to prison’ (CPT/Inf (2014)13, para 39). In this direction, the 
Court and the CoM strongly urge national authorities in countries 
with structural problems to pursue reform of criminal law and policy. 
Detention (whether at the pre-trial or the postconviction phase) must 
be a measure of last resort, and there should be greater use of 
alternative non-custodial sanctions. Adopted in response to the pilot 
judgment of Bragadireanu v. Romania, the new 2014 Criminal Code 
of Romania introduces new alternatives to detention on remand 
(house arrest and release under judicial supervision, extending the 
scope of pecuniary sentences). It also modifies the conditions for 
applying measures alter-native to imprisonment and it strengthens 
the role of the probation service—all these with the aim of redressing 
one of the worst problems of prison overcrowding in Europe.64 
Romania witnessed a steady increase in its prison population in 
2007–2013, while the small decrease that was recorded in 2014 was 
not considered sufficient or sustainable by the CoM.65
A main cause of prison overcrowding is the all too facile resort to pre- 
trial custody, including for persons suspected for economic crimes (as in 
Russia) as well as to imprisonment, even for persons committing petty 
offences (as in Hungary). In the past few years, in Greece, measures 
to decrease prison overcrowding have focused primarily on limiting 
the number of persons sent to prison to execute a sentence 
(alternatives to imprisonment) and on ensuring a reduction of the 
population of con-victed inmates by means of suspension of prison 
terms or early release schemes.66 In Italy, legislative reforms of criminal 
law and policy in 2013 aimed at reducing the prison entry flows have 
redefined the seriousness of a variety of offences and the conditions 
under which incarceration is nec-essary. They have also provided for 
early release in less serious cases, made 
possible home arrest for some vulnerable individuals, and made it 
possi-ble to release offenders whose crime is less serious (i.e. drug 
addicts). Additional measures prepared by the Italian government to 
reduce prison overcrowding aim at reducing recourse to imprisonment 
through extend-ing the use of alternative measures such as probation, 
social services, and the use of electronic monitoring.67
A third important kind of reform promoted by the ECtHR and the 
CoM is the provision of an effective domestic remedy, which prisoners, 
whose human rights were violated, can use to seek redress and 
com-pensation. The issue arose as central in the pilot judgments of 
Ananyev and others v. Russia and Torreggiani and others v. Italy. 
In 2013, the Russian government presented a draft law that would 
empower domes-tic courts to order specific remedial measures, to set 
limits for enforce-ment of the orders, and to define the authority 
responsible for enforcement. In response to the Torreggiani 
judgments, Italy also established in 2013 a remedy allowing inmates 
to complain about vio-lations of their rights to a supervisory judge 
and introduced the legal means to enforce a relevant judicial order. 
Another Italian law that came into force in 2014 also provided the 
possibility for compensation of an inmate whose rights were violated 
due to prison conditions, in the form of pecuniary and non- 
pecuniary (i.e. reduction of his/her sentence) compensation.68
The CoM is particularly scrutinizing how and the extent to which 
such a domestic remedy is effective in practice. The Court has 
indicated that to be efficient, a remedial system must ensure a 
prompt and dili-gent handling of prisoners’ complaints, secure their 
effective participa-tion in the examination of grievances, and dispose 
of a wide range of legal tools for the purpose of eradicating the 
identified breach of the Convention. Taking the input contained in the 
submission of the NGO ‘Public Verdict Foundation’ on board,69 the 
CoM urged the Russian government to further consider various 
aspects of the draft law to ensure that the burden of proof shifts to the 
prison authorities once the claim-ant has established a prima facie 
case that s/he has suffered ill-treatment due to unacceptable prison 
conditions, as well as to ensure that court fees and other costs for 
the complainants do not have a dissuasive effect.70 In Romania, 
the CoM was critical of the compensatory aspect 
of the adopted remedy because it can succeed only if the applicant 
(pris-oner) can prove the defendant’s (the prison) fault; overcrowding 
may very well be linked to penal law and policy rather than stem from 
the prison system itself.71 Last but not least, the adoption of a 
domestic remedy compliant with the ECHR and the Court’s case law 
involves not only legal reform and procedural rules, but it also requires 
substan-tial changes in judicial approach and practice.
 Discussion and Conclusion
The preceding broad review of state implementation of ECtHR judg-
ments pertaining to prison conditions shows that their impact is lim-
ited, albeit far from insignificant. Prison-related human rights 
violations arose as early as the 1970s and 1980s in countries like 
the UK, Austria, Belgium, and Germany. The Strasbourg Court’s 
judg-ments prompted significant reforms through the reluctant yet 
progres-sive recognition of prisoners’ rights, in matters such 
as release procedures, communication of prisoners with the 
outside world, and formal discipline proceedings (Livingstone 2000: 
321). Yet, the struc-tural problem of prison overpopulation and 
debased material condi-tions has emerged as far more pronounced 
and extensive in the new post-communist member states that 
acceded to the ECHR and the CoE in the 1990s. In both parts of 
Europe, the rising numbers of incarcerated persons have been 
related to a distinctive trend in penal law to impose stricter and 
longer sentences intended to establish crime control and to remove 
seemingly dangerous individuals from the soci-ety at large (Snacken 
2015).
Tackling prison overcrowding and inhumane conditions of impris-
onment is an exceedingly complex, time-consuming, and demanding 
process, which cannot be carried out by legislative reform alone. 
Besides the (re)construction of prisons in order to create more 
spaces, redress-ing the problem at its root further requires fundamental 
reform towards more moderate penal policies—politically and socially 
a highly contro-versial issue. It also requires the establishment of 
effective domestic remedies, which in turn presupposes some 
level of acceptance of  
prisoners’ rights, as well as a change in national judicial approach 
and culture. Where substantial or even dramatic reductions in 
imprison-ment rates have been achieved (as in Finland since the 
1970s and 1980s), it has been the result of deliberate and long-term 
policy change based on firm political will and consensus to bring down 
the number of inmates (Coyle 2006: 106).
Besides the complexity of reforming Europe’s penitentiary 
systems, time to implementation is further prolonged by the more 
scrutinizing approach and demanding supervision exercised by the 
CoM, especially in regard to violations considered to be of 
structural and systemic nature. At least in relation to such violations, 
which form the bulk of prison- related judgments in the former 
communist countries but also in countries like Greece and Italy, the 
observation that the Court takes a highly individualized approach 
(Foster 2015: 395) does not hold. In fact, the states, which the ECtHR 
has identified as the ones plagued by systemic problems of prison 
overcrowding and inhumane detention conditions more broadly, are 
under enhanced pressure to engage in reforms in different areas, in 
order to mount an effective response. The action plans that the 
national governments submit to the CoM, in which they outline and 
describe the various measures, are often thor-ough and detailed. 
They include projections about the effects that the planned reforms 
are going to have on prison populations. This is the case even for 
reluctant states like Russia, which has nonetheless intro-duced 
significant even if insufficient measures to reform the country’s 
prisons (Parrott 2015). Still, these action plans may contain proposed 
or intended reforms that are subsequently not legislated or are not put 
into practice.
The ECtHR judgments that find European prison conditions and 
practices to infringe basic human rights standards do not—cannot—
bring about fundamental reform of the penitentiary systems of states. It 
would be unrealistic to expect judicial decisions to have such an 
effect; they are only one factor among many that affect policy making in 
such a controversial and multi-actor field as penal law and penitentiary 
institu-tions. Yet, what Strasbourg judgments have over time managed to 
do is to enhance judicial oversight over imprisonment standards and 
conditions, 
an area of largely administrative regulation, in which prison authorities 
had far-reaching (and still maintain considerable) discretion. By doing 
so, these judgments provide ample leverage to domestic prison 
reformers, among political elites but also state administrators, to pursue 
changes for improved conditions of incarceration.
The ECtHR judgments have also helped open up the closed nature of 
penitentiary institutions to independent supervisory bodies, such as 
ombudsman institutions. For example, the Bulgarian authorities reported 
that since 2012, the ombudsman is allowed to perform visits and inspec-
tions in detention facilities and to give recommendations on the treat-
ment of detained persons. Along with civil society organizations, such as 
the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee and the Centre for the Study of 
Democracy as well as the NGO Bulgarian Lawyers for Human Rights, 
the ombudsman also takes part in the working group for the execution of 
the judgment Neshkov and Others, and in the drawing up of plans for 
improvement of conditions of detention in Bulgarian detention 
facilities.72
With the new rules and the greater transparency established in 
the supervision process by the CoM, NGOs are now actively 
engaged in following the ECtHR judgments and in drawing from 
them in the domestic contestation over penitentiary reform. The new 
role of NGOs in the process of execution of judgments appears to be 
highly signifi-cant. It tends to present a different and critical picture of 
the govern-ment’s proposed and actual measures, substantiated by 
official data or by documentation obtained from NGO monitoring of 
prisons. For exam-ple, the report of the Association for the Defense of 
Human Rights in Romania—the Helsinki Committee (APADOR-CH) in 
the context of CoM supervision of execution in the pilot judgment of 
Bragadireanu was clearly influential in disputing the government’s 
claim of improve-ment. On the basis of official data, APADOR-CH 
showed that the mea-sures adopted to ameliorate poor detention 
conditions were thoroughly insufficient to change the state of 
dilapidation in Romanian prisons, the degrading treatment of 
vulnerable prisoners such as minors, and the lack of appropriate 
health care, which falls well below ECHR and CPT standards.73
In sum, despite the fact that the ECtHR judgments have not influ-
enced any evident shift in penal policy in European states, they have trig-
gered a variety of reforms that do show some, even if limited, positive 
change. The slow decline of prison overcrowding that is recorded over 
the past few years is possibly one visible consequence of the 
domestically implemented measures (Aebi and Delgrande 2015).
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